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This paper first takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the recent adoption of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union in the 
context of discussions on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’, as 
fixed in the Maastricht Treaty for membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in a 
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Economic Policy Coordination 
in the Economic and Monetary Union 
From Maastricht via the SGP to the Fiscal Pact 
Jørgen Mortensen* 
CEPS Working Document No. 381 / August 2013 
1.  Introduction 
At  the  European  Council  meeting  on  9  December  2011,  all  17  members  of  the  eurozone 
agreed  on  the  basic  outlines  of  a  new  intergovernmental  treaty  to  put  strict  caps  on 
government spending  and  borrowing,  with penalties  for  countries  deemed  to  violate  the 
limits.  All  non-eurozone  countries  except  the  United  Kingdom  indicated  that  they  were 
prepared to join, subject to parliamentary vote. On 30 January 2012, all European Council 
members, except the United Kingdom and Czech Republic, endorsed the final version of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union at 
the European summit in Brussels. The Treaty, sometimes called the ‘Fiscal Pact’, entered into 
force on 1 January 2013 as it had been ratified by the necessary minimum of 12 eurozone 
countries as stipulated in Article 14.  
The present paper, which in the initial sections constitute extracts of Mortensen (2004), first 
takes a step backwards with an attempt to situate the adoption of this Treaty in discussions 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the ‘Maastricht criteria’ (the criteria for EMU 
membership  fixed  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty)  in  a  longer  perspective  of  the  sharing  of 
competences  for  macroeconomic  policy-making within  the  EU. It  then  presents  the  main 
features  of  the  Fiscal  Treaty  and  its  relation  to  the  SGP  and  draws  some  conclusions  as 
regards the importance and relevance of this new step in the process of economic policy 
coordination. 
2.  Policy coordination or policy competition? 
Whereas  the  original  Rome  Treaty  was  overwhelmingly  focused  on  the  creation  of  the 
customs  union  and  the  common  agricultural  policy  (CAP),  a  mechanism  for  ‘soft 
coordination’ of economic policy was created in the early 1960s through the creation in 1960 
of  a  Conjunctural  Policy  Committee  and  in  1964  of  a  Medium-Term  Economic  Policy 
Committee and a Committee of Central Bank Governors. In practice the tasks facing these 
committees were not challenging: underlying economic growth was strong, unemployment 
was low, rates of inflation were also low and external imbalances limited. The debates were 
mainly ex post presentations and debates of policy measures taken by the member states and 
were thus not liable to seriously influence the economic and monetary policy decisions at the 
EU level. 
Following a conference of Heads of State and Government in the Hague in 1969, a committee 
under the chairmanship of Pierre Werner in June 1970 presented a plan for an Economic and 
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Monetary Union and a more ambitious (prior) coordination of economic policy (see Werner 
Plan,  1970).  This  plan  entailed  the  creation  of  two  new  Community  bodies:  a  Centre  of 
Decision for Economic Policy and a Community System for Central Banks. The Council did 
not  retain  this  institutional  innovation,  but  it  nevertheless  decided  in  March  1971  that 
economic and monetary union implied the transfer of competences for economic policy from 
the national to the Community level and to this end adopted the Werner Plan for EMU in 
stages. 
However, just a few months after the adoption of the ambitious Werner Plan, the Bretton 
Woods system, which had been under heavy pressure for some time due in particular to the 
large external deficit of the United States, broke down definitively. In May 1971 the DM and 
the Guilder were disconnected from the US dollar and on August, 15th the dollar-to-gold 
convertibility was suspended by order of President Nixon. In the course of the autumn of 
1971,  the  Benelux  currencies,  the  lira  and  the  yen  were  floated.  In  view  of  the  chaotic 
situation  in  exchange  markets  and  the  large  disparities  within  the  European Community 
with respect to the economic policy response to the new situation, the Council in November 
1973 decided not to move forward to the second stage of EMU. During the following months 
the first oil price increase added to the chaos and uncertainty concerning policy-making both 
inside and outside the EC. 
In  the  mid-1970s,  at  least  two  attempts  were  made  to  reintroduce  some  degree  of 
coordination of policy-making within the EU: 
  A report on the prospect for Economic and Monetary Union (European Commission, 
1975) by a group of experts under the chairmanship of Robert Marjolin in 1975. The 
report argued that the failure to move to the second stage of EMU was due both to 
insufficient political will and to a misunderstanding of the nature and the conditions 
for a successful functioning of an EMU. 
  A report on the role of public finances in European Integration (European Commission, 
1997) by an expert group under Sir Donald MacDougall. This report argued in favour 
of a significant expansion of the budget of the EU notably by increasing the role of the 
EU’s budget with respect to redistribution between member states. 
However, a genuine move towards a certain degree of monetary coordination was made 
only with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in December 1978. During 
the  following  15  years,  the  EMS  showed  a  certain  capacity  to  constitute  a  basis  for 
implementation not only on monetary but also of budgetary policy. This was essentially due 
to the fact that domestic policy of the member states for the first time after the breakdown of 
the  Bretton  Woods  agreement  was  called  upon  to  take  explicit  account  of  external 
constraints, in this case the observance of the limits for fluctuation of exchanges rates within 
the EMS limits.  
The creation of the EMS and the resulting constraints on domestic economic and monetary 
policy of the participating countries in no way was greeted with satisfaction by all camps. In 
fact, the ensuing limitation on the freedom of manoeuvre of domestic policy was considered 
a heresy by a number of influential economists around the world. It was argued by many 
that  the  EU  in  no  way  constituted  an  ‘optimal currency  area’.  With  relatively  low  cross-
frontier mobility of production factors, the EU member states were, according to this school 
of thought, in the case of ‘asymmetric shocks’ strongly in need of exchange rate flexibility. 
Without exchange rate flexibility, adjustment to supply and demand shocks would be more 
likely  to  result  in unemployment  or  demand pressures  and  the  EMS  would  therefore  be 
likely to result in welfare losses in the longer run. ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION IN EMU  3 
 
Even among the supporters of the original idea of Jean Monnet to use monetary union as a 
tool rather than a final objective for European integration1 there was recognition that the EMS 
could  only  constitute  an  intermediate  stage  in  the  move  towards  full  monetary  union. 
Furthermore,  there  was  increasing  awareness  that  the  original  objectives  of  creating  a 
customs union and a ‘level playing field’ were far from being attained. The Commission, 
under  the  new  President  Jacques  Delors,  therefore  in  1985  launched  a  programme  to 
eliminate the remaining (non-tariff) barriers to the movement of goods, services, labour and 
capital within the internal market (called the ‘1992 programme’ due to the fact that the target 
was to eliminate these barriers in 1992 at the latest). This programme was adopted by the 
Council and the Commission then launched a comprehensive legislative process leading to 
the adoption of almost 300 new directives forming the legal basis for ensuring a level playing 
field in a number of areas. Furthermore, at the beginning of 1986 Spain and Portugal entered 
into the European Community and the extension of the EU single market legislation to the 
EFTA countries was initiated with the creation of the European Economic Area. 
In April 1986, the Commission (under President Jacques Delors) asked a group of experts to 
investigate the economic consequences of the decision to enlarge the Community to include 
Spain  and  Portugal  and  to  create  a  market  without  internal  frontiers  by  year  1992.  The 
Report by the Group, chaired by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, then Deputy Director-General 
of the Banca d’Italia, was delivered in 1987 under the eloquent title: “Efficiency, Stability and 
Equity: A Strategy for the Evolution of the Economic System of the European Community”.2 
The Report (see Padoa-Schioppa, 1987) argued that: 
  The 1992 programme implied a very strong action to improve the efficiency of resource 
allocation. 
  The  1992  programme  created  a  need  for  complementary  action  to  foster 
macroeconomic stability. Specifically as regards monetary stability, the Group argued 
that the programme implied a need for considering afresh the case for a strengthened 
monetary coordination. 
  There  were,  according  to  the  Group,  serious  risks  of  aggravation  of  regional 
imbalances. Reforms and development of Community structural funds were therefore 
appropriate. 
  The  1992  programme  enhanced  the  need  for  ensuring  consistency  between 
microeconomic  and  macroeconomic  policy  with  sustained impetus on both supply and 
demand sides of the macroeconomic ‘equation’. 
The Group argued that as monetary integration progressed, national budgets would also 
have to be subject to more intense common disciplines. However, the Report also argued (p. 
10) that “the decentralised model evident in the mature federations, where the capital market 
exerts  some  restraint  on  state  borrowing,  is  more  plausible  in  the  long  run  than  power 
sharing arrangements that have sometimes been considered”.  
The Padoa-Schioppa Group on the other hand, warned against a “precipitate move” in the 
direction  of  monetary  union,  arguing  that  further  adaptation  of  attitudes  and  behaviour 
among private “agents” as well as of political attitudes were required for monetary union to 
be a sufficiently low-risk proposition. 
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Nevertheless,  less  than  a  year  after  the  publication  of  the  Padoa-Schioppa  Report,  the 
European  Council,  in  June  1988  in  Hanover  decided  to  examine  the  means  of  achieving 
economic and monetary union. The task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading 
towards EMU was entrusted to a committee chaired by the President of the Commission and 
with the participation of the central bank governors of the European Community, one other 
member of the Commission and three experts. The Report was submitted in April 1989. 
3.  From the Delors Report to the Stability and Growth Pact 
3.1  The Delors Committee’s outline for EMU 
The Report (here after called the Delors Report) provided, first, a brief review of past and 
present developments in economic and monetary integration in the Community, second, a 
detailed examination of the key aspects of the final stage of economic and monetary union 
and, third, a blueprint for the attainment of this union through a gradual approach. 
As regards the basic features of economic and monetary union, the Delors Report did not 
diverge  fundamentally  from  the  Werner  Report.  In  contrast  to  the  latter,  which  saw 
macroeconomic policy coordination mainly as a way to increase the efficiency of demand 
management, the Delors Report was more concerned with defining Community procedures 
to ensure the fixing of upper limits to budget deficits and defining the overall stance of fiscal 
policy in a medium-term framework. First and foremost, however, the Report recommended 
the establishment of a new Community institution of a status comparable to the existing 
ones: a European System of Central Banks. The Werner Report had proposed `a Community 
system for the central banks, but was much less specific than the Delors Report as to the 
status of this institution within the overall institutional framework. In sharp contrast to the 
Werner Report, moreover, the Delors Report did not propose a specific timetable for the 
initiation  of  the  scheme nor  for  the  transition  to  the subsequent stages  of  the process  of 
creation of EMU. 
Like the Padoa-Schioppa Report, the Delors Report considered the `principle of subsidiarity’ 
(according to which the functions of higher levels of government should be as limited as 
possible and should be subsidiary to those of lower levels) an essential element in defining 
the  appropriate  distribution  of  power  within  the  Community.  It  nevertheless  expressed 
strong  fears  that  “uncoordinated  and  divergent  budgetary  policies  would  undermine 
monetary  stability  and  generate  imbalances  in  the  real  and  financial  sectors  of  the 
Community”.  Moreover,  because  the  centrally-managed  Community  budget  is  likely  to 
remain a very small part of total public sector spending and much of it will not be available 
for cyclical adjustments, “the task of setting a Community-wide fiscal policy stance will have 
to be performed through the coordination of national budgetary policies”. In fact, according 
to  the  Delors  Committee,  monetary  policy  alone  cannot  be  expected  to  establish  a 
fiscal/monetary  policy  mix  appropriate  for  the  preservation  of  internal  balance  or  for 
ensuring that the Community plays its part in the international adjustment process. In sharp 
contrast  to  the  MacDougall  Report,  however,  the  Delors  Report  did  not  envisage  any 
significant expansion of the Community’s own budget even in the later stages of the EMU. 
A key condition for moving to irrevocably-locked exchange rates (the third stage of EMU), 
according to the Committee, would be that the rules and procedures of the Community in 
the macroeconomic and budgetary field would become binding, implying that the Council of 
Ministers in cooperation with the European Parliament would have the authority to take 
directly-enforceable decisions with respect to national budgets, make discretionary changes 
in Community resources and apply terms and conditions to existing Community structural 
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strengthened and their instruments and resources adapted to the needs of the economic and 
monetary union. 
The  Delors  Committee’s  fear  that  market  forces  would  not  exert  sufficient  disciplinary 
influence upon national governments’ borrowing was spelled out in detail in a background 
paper by Alexandre Lamfalussy. According to this paper (Lamfalussy, 1989), the fact that in 
federal states like the United States, Germany or Australia there are few constraints on the 
budgetary policies of sub-federal governments does not imply that such constraints will not 
be needed in the European Community. In fact, according to Lamfalussy, member states of 
the  European  Community  appear,  by  history  and  tradition,  to  exhibit  much  larger  and 
persistent fiscal divergences than observed in federal states and it would not be wise to rely 
principally on the free functioning of financial markets to iron out any excessive differences 
in  fiscal  behaviour  between  member  countries.  Fiscal  policy  coordination,  therefore, 
according to this paper, would appear to be “a vital element of a European EMU and of the 
process towards it”. 
A strong call for tight constraints on member states’ freedom of action in budgetary policy 
was  also  put  forward  in  a  paper  contributed  by  Karl-Otto  Pöhl. According  to  this  paper 
(Pöhl,  1989),  whereas  the  national  States  would  necessarily  lose  their  monetary  policy 
independence in a monetary union, they can quite easily retain certain responsibilities in the 
field of fiscal and economic policy, as is the case in every federation of states. However, in 
order to exclude any doubts about the cohesion of the monetary union from the outset and at 
the same time to avoid overburdening monetary policy, it would be necessary to ensure con-
formity of action in fiscal and economic policy within the Community. This is because any 
lack of convergence that could give rise to expectations of parity changes would need to be 
‘bridged’ through interventions and interest rate measures on the national money markets in 
order to ensure the continuing existence of the monetary or exchange-rate union. Over time 
it will thus, according to Pöhl, be necessary to allow for the necessary transfer of economic 
and fiscal policy responsibilities from national authorities to Community organs. 
Transfer of fiscal authority to Community organs, according to Pöhl, although necessary, 
would not be a sufficient condition for the smooth functioning of a monetary union in the 
Community. The procedures of income formation would also have to be flexible enough to 
accommodate  differing  rates  of  increase  in  productivity  or  shifts  in  demand  leading  to 
divergences in regional developments. Even so, it will, he argued, be necessary to put in 
place  a  system  of  “fiscal  compensation”  through  a  Community  organ  in  favour  of  the 
structurally-weak  member  countries,  compensating  the  latter  “`for  the  burdens  of 
adjustment  associated  with  the  definitive  renouncement  of  devaluations  as  a  means  of 
maintaining their competitiveness”. 
Although, as indicated above, the Delors Committee attached a high priority to the principle 
of  subsidiarity,  it argued  that  the  approach  to economic  and monetary union  must  even 
more  strictly  respect  the  principle  of  parallelism  between  economic  and  monetary 
integration. Although temporary deviations from parallelism are part of the dynamic process 
of  the  Community,  the  Report  said,  material  progress  on  the  economic  front  would  be 
necessary for further progress on the monetary front. The Report, thus, implicitly came out 
quite strongly against the idea of using monetary integration as an instrument in the process 
of economic (and political) integration. 
Whereas the Delors Report on the whole turned out to be the expression of the views of 
central bank governors, other actors in the EMU game were not necessarily in support of 
further steps in the field of monetary integration. In fact, certain EU member governments, 
such as notably the UK government, suggested retaining the EMS as a key feature in support 
of the completed single market. In addition, other experts were much less keen than the 6  JØRGEN MORTENSEN 
 
central bank governors in the Delors Committee to promote the idea of ‘parallelism’ between 
economic, monetary and budgetary integration.  
In  fact,  even  within  the  Commission  services  there  was  not  full  support  of  the  main 
arguments in the Delors Report. Thus, an ECFIN opinion on the EMU published after the 
Delors  Report  argued  that  Monetary  Union,  in  order  to  be  viable,  should  be  founded 
essentially (and only) on two basic principles: i) no monetary financing of the budget deficits 
of member governments and ii) no bail-out of national government debt by the EU.  
3.2  The Maastricht Treaty 
Despite the resistance of some member states, the European Community in 1990 started the 
process that would lead to the adoption of EMU. A Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, the term for the inter-governmental conference (ICG), 
convened in Rome on 15 December 1990 to adopt by common accord the amendments to be 
made  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European Economic  Community  with  a view  to  the 
achievement of political union and with a view to the final stages of economic and monetary 
union. The final negotiations took place in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, giving rise to the 
creation of the European Central Bank and Treaty changes concerning also Justice and Home 
Affairs and external policy. With respect to EMU, the Maastricht Treaty largely reflected the 
views of the Delors Committee. 
The final Treaty thus, in ‘ARTICLE 4 a, stipulated as follows: 
A  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘ESCB’)  and  a 
European  Central  Bank  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘ECB’)  shall  be  established  in 
accordance with the procedures laid down in this Treaty; they shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon them by this Treaty and by the Statute of the 
ESCB  and  of  the  ECB  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’)  annexed 
thereto.’ 
The details on the creation and functioning of the ECB were (as indicated) presented in a 
protocol. Another protocol specified the conditions which should be fulfilled by a member 
state in order to participate in the final stage of economic and monetary union, that is, the 
replacement of the national currency by the euro and acquiring the rights to become a full 
member of the ECB (the ‘convergence criteria’). The protocol fixed the following convergence 
criteria: 
1.  That the average rate of inflation in the member state, observed over a period of one 
year before the examination, did not exceed by more than 1½ percentage point that of, 
at most, the three best performing member states; 
2.  That the member state was not the subject of an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ according 
to article 104c(6) of the Treaty; 
3.  That  the  member  state  for  at  least  two  years  had  respected  the  normal  fluctuation 
margin within the EMS; and  
4.  That the average long-term interest rate had not exceeded by more than 2 percentage 
points  that  of,  at  most,  the  three  best-performing  member  states  in  terms  of  price 
stability. 
When commenting on the results of the Maastricht IGC, the then Commissioner responsible 
for Economic and Financial Affairs, Henning Christophersen, stated that the Commission 
had been in favour of either no criteria at all or at least a higher degree of ‘tolerance’ for EMU 
membership. But at least one key member state (Germany) had insisted on the maintenance 
of such rigorous rules of the game in order to go forward to EMU. The Maastricht Treaty also ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION IN EMU  7 
 
fixed the time frame for moving to the final phase of EMU (Article 109 j) in the following 
terms: 
Taking due account of the reports referred to in paragraph 1 and the opinion of the 
European  Parliament  referred  to  in  paragraph  2,  the  Council,  meeting  in  the 
composition of Heads of State or of Government, shall, acting by a qualified majority, 
not later than 31 December 1996: 
- decide, on the basis of the recommendations of the Council referred to in paragraph 
2, whether a majority of the Member States fulfil the necessary conditions for the 
adoption of a single currency; 
- decide whether it is appropriate for the Community to enter the third stage, and if 
so 
- set the date for the beginning of the third stage. 
4. If by the end of 1997 the date for the beginning of the third stage has not been set, 
the third stage shall start on 1 January 1999. Before 1 July 1998, the Council, meeting 
in  the  composition  of  Heads  of  State  or  of  Government,  after  a  repetition  of  the 
procedure  provided for  in  paragraphs  1  and  2, with  the  exception  of  the  second 
indent of paragraph 2, taking into account the reports referred to in paragraph 1 and 
the opinion of the European Parliament, shall, acting by a qualified majority and on 
the basis of the recommendations of the Council referred to in paragraph 2, confirm 
which  Member  States  fulfil  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  adoption  of  a  single 
currency. 
3.3  The Stability and Growth Pact 
With the ultimate limit for passing to Stage 3 (1 January 1999) approaching, some member 
states  became  increasingly  concerned  with  the  possibility  of  irresponsible  budgetary 
behaviour by governments once admitted in the EMU club. The need for establishing rules of 
the  game  once  inside  the  EMU  was  recognised  by  the  Madrid  European  Council  in 
December  1995  and  reiterated  in  Florence  six  months  later.  An  agreement  on  the  main 
features  was  reached  in  Dublin  in  December  1996  and  final  agreement  on  the  text  was 
reached on 7 July 1997. 
Broadly speaking, the SGP stipulates the need for observing the Maastricht criteria even after 
EMU membership and provides somewhat specific guidelines for the process of deciding 
whether  an  EMU  member  country  runs  an  excessive  deficit.  The  SGP,  however,  goes 
considerably beyond the Maastricht Treaty by giving the Council the competence to impose 
sanctions  if  a  participating  member  state  fails  to  take  the  necessary  steps  to  bring  an 
excessive deficit to an end. Whenever the Council decides to impose sanctions it is ‘urged’ 
always  to  require  a  non-interest  bearing  deposit  in  accordance  with  Article  104(11).  It  is 
again ‘urged’ to convert a deposit into a fine after two years unless the excessive deficit has, 
in the view of the Council, been corrected. 
As presented by the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European 
Commission, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is the concrete EU answer to concerns on 
the continuation of budgetary discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Adopted 
in 1997 as indicated above, the SGP strengthened the Treaty provisions on fiscal discipline in 
EMU foreseen by Articles 99 and 104, and the full provisions took effect when the euro was 
launched on 1 January 1999. 
The principal concern of the SGP was to enforce fiscal discipline as a permanent feature of 
EMU. Safeguarding sound government finances was considered a means to strengthening 
the  conditions  for  price  stability  and  for  strong  and  sustainable  growth  conducive  to 8  JØRGEN MORTENSEN 
 
employment creation. However, it was also recognised that the loss of the exchange rate 
instrument in EMU would imply a greater role for automatic fiscal stabilisers at national 
level  to  help  economies  adjust  to  asymmetric  shocks,  and  would  make  it  “necessary  to 
ensure that national budgetary policies support stability oriented monetary policies”. This is 
the  rationale  behind  the  core  commitment  of  the  SGP,  i.e.  to  set  the  “…  medium-term 
objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus…” which “… will allow all 
Member  States  to  deal  with  normal  cyclical  fluctuations  while  keeping  the  government 
deficit within the reference value of 3% of GDP”. 
Formally, the SGP consists of three elements as follows:  
  A  political  commitment  by  all  parties  involved  in  the  SGP  (Commission,  Member 
States,  Council)  to  the  full  and  timely  implementation  of  the  budget  surveillance 
process.  These  are  contained  in  a  Resolution  agreed  by  the  Amsterdam  European 
Council of 17 June 1997. This political commitment ensures that effective peer pressure 
is exerted on a member state failing to live up to its commitments.  
  Preventive  elements  which  through  regular  surveillance  aim  at  preventing  budget 
deficits going above the 3% reference value. To this end, Council Regulation 1466/97 
reinforces  the  multilateral  surveillance  of  budget  positions  and  the  coordination  of 
economic  policies.  It  foresees  the  submission  by  all  member  states  of  stability  and 
convergence programmes, which will be examined by the Council.  
  Dissuasive  elements,  which  in  the  event  of  the 3%  reference  value  being  breached, 
require member states to take immediate corrective action and, if necessary, allow for 
the  imposition  of  sanctions.  These  elements  are  contained  in  Council  Regulation 
1467/97  on  speeding  up  and  clarifying  the  implementation  of  the  excessive  deficit 
procedure.  
Besides this legal basis, the Code of Conduct on the content and format of the stability and 
convergence programmes, endorsed by the ECOFIN Council on 10 July 2001, incorporated 
the essential elements of Council Regulation 1466/97 into guidelines to assist the member 
states in drawing up their programmes. It also aims at facilitating the examination of the 
programmes by the Commission, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Council.  
The right of initiative in this procedure is attributed to the Commission. 
3.4  Examination and monitoring of programmes 
In conformity with the SGP, the Council examined the original 1999 programmes. Since then 
the  Council  assesses  the  annual  programme  updates  at  the  beginning  of  each year.  This 
examination is based on assessments by the Commission and the Economic and Financial 
Committee and includes considerations as to: 
  whether the medium-term budget objective in the programme provides for a safety 
margin to ensure the avoidance of an excessive deficit;  
  whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are realistic;  
  whether  the  measures  being  taken  and/or  proposed  are  sufficient  to  achieve  the 
medium-term  budgetary  objective  (and,  for  convergence  programmes,  to  achieve 
sustained convergence);  
  whether the content of the programme facilitates the closer co-ordination of economic 
policies; and 
  whether the economic policies of the member state concerned are consistent with the 
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On  a  recommendation  from  the  Commission,  and  after  consulting  the  Economic  and 
Financial Committee, the Council delivers an opinion on each programme, and can invite the 
member  state  concerned  to  strengthen  it.  The  Council  monitors  the  implementation  of 
programmes  and,  to  prevent  an  excessive  deficit,  can  recommend  to  the  member  state 
concerned  to  take  adjustment  measures.  If  subsequent  monitoring  suggests  worsening 
budgetary divergence, the Council can recommend taking prompt corrective measures.  
3.5  The Excessive Deficit Procedure 
The Treaty (Article 104) obliges member states to avoid excessive budgetary deficits, defined 
by a reference value of 3% of GDP. Article 104 also sets out an excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP) to be followed at Community level to identify and counter such excessive deficits, 
including the possibility of financial sanctions. To make this a more effective deterrent, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) clarified and speeded up the excessive deficit procedure. 
The EDP refers to the procedure as specified by Council Regulation 1467/97 included in the 
SGP. 
3.5.1  Identifying an excessive deficit and requesting the member state to correct it 
The EDP sets out schedules and deadlines for the Council, following reports from and on the 
basis of opinions by the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, to reach a 
decision that an excessive deficit exists. Such a decision is taken within three months of the 
reporting  deadlines  for  government  finances  of  1  March  and  1  September  each  year 
established by Council. A government deficit exceeding the reference value of 3% of GDP is 
considered exceptional and temporary and is not subject to sanctions when: 
  It results from an unusual event outside the control of the member state concerned and 
has a major impact on the financial position of the general government;  
  It results from a severe economic downturn (if there is an annual fall of real GDP of at 
least 2%).  
When it decides that an excessive deficit does exist, the Council makes recommendations to 
the member state concerned and establishes a deadline of four months for effective corrective 
action to be taken. In the absence of special circumstances, such action is that which ensures 
completion of the correction of the excessive deficit in the year following its identification. If, 
after a progressive notice procedure, the member state fails to comply with the Council’s 
decisions, the Council normally decides to impose sanctions, at the latest, 10 months after 
reporting of the data indicating an excessive deficit exists. 
3.5.2  Sanctions 
Sanctions first take the form of a non-interest-bearing deposit with the Commission. The 
amount of this deposit comprises a fixed component equal to 0.2% of GDP and a variable 
component linked to the size of the deficit. Each following year the Council may decide to 
intensify the sanctions by requiring an additional deposit, although the annual amount of 
deposits may not exceed the upper limit of 0.5% of GDP. A deposit is as a rule converted into 
a fine if, in the view of the Council, the excessive deficit has not been corrected after two 
years. 
3.5.3  Abrogation of sanctions 
The  Council  may  decide  to  abrogate  some  or  all  of  the  sanctions,  depending  on  the 
significance of the progress made by the participating member state concerned in correcting 
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the existence of an excessive deficit is itself abrogated. However, any fines already imposed 
are not reimbursable. Interest on the deposits lodged with the Commission, and the yield 
from fines, are distributed among member states without an excessive deficit, in proportion 
to their share in the total GNP of eligible member states. 
In reality the procedures outlined in the SGP and the EDP proved to be incapable of ensuring 
implementation of the rules in line with the original objectives. A first case of EDP emerged 
in 2002 with respect to Portugal. After some back-and-forth negotiations and re-estimation of 
budget  deficits,  the Portuguese government  at  the  end  of  2002  took  further measures  of 
budgetary consolidation and in its new assessment in February 2003 the Commission revised 
considerably downward the forecast budget deficits, which consequently were brought just 
below the 3% threshold for 2003 and were expected to fall further in 2004.  
However, already in late 2002 and early 2003, it became clear that first Germany and later 
France were in serious risk of running general government budget deficits in excess of the 
limits fixed in the Maastricht Treaty and in the SGP. In fact the Council, already in January 
2003, decided that an excessive deficit existed in Germany and recommended that Germany 
“put an end to the present excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible”. It noted the 
German government’s expressed resolve to deal with these issues and established a deadline 
of 21 May 2003 at the latest for the German government to take the measures required to 
ensure that the rise in public debt be brought to a halt in 2003 and reversed thereafter. 
As far as France was concerned, the Council on 3 June 2003 decided that an excessive deficit 
existed  and  adopted  a  recommendation  that  France  put  an  end  to  this  excessive-deficit 
situation before 3 October 2003 and achieve a significantly larger cyclically-adjusted deficit in 
2003 than planned in June. 
Since neither of the two governments had acted according to the Council recommendations, 
the  Commission  in  October  (France)  and  November  (Germany)  recommended  that  the 
Council proceed with the adoption of the sanctions envisaged in the SGP. Nevertheless, on 
25 November when the Council took a vote on the Commission’s draft recommendations, 
the  required  qualified  majority  for  applying  sanctions  was  not  reached.  However,  the 
conclusions agreed to hold the excessive deficit procedure “in abeyance for the time being” 
and invited both France and Germany to “regularly report on the progress made in fulfilling 
the commitments to reduce the deficits”. 
On 13 January 2004, the European Commission decided to challenge, before the European 
Court of Justice, the legality of the procedures under which (according to the Commission) 
the  eurozone’s  disciplinary  rules  on  budget  balances  as  determined  by  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact (SGP) had been broken by the Council. This step was the Commission’s reaction 
to the Ecofin Council’s decision on 25 November 2003 not to apply sanctions on the German 
and French governments for exceeding the limits to budget deficits as determined in the 
“excessive  deficit  procedures”  provided  for  in  the  SGP.  However,  the  Commission 
underlined that it would continue the conduct of economic and budgetary surveillance for 
all  member states  in  the  framework  of  the  Treaty  and  the  SGP  and  continue  to  monitor 
developments for countries in excessive deficit. It also announced that it would make new 
proposals for the strengthening of economic governance in the future, including proposals 
for improvements in the implementation of the SGP. 
In its judgment of 13 July 2004, the Court of Justice clarified the powers of the Commission 
and the Council relating to the Excessive Deficit Procedure. It went a long way towards the 
Commission’s claims in so far as it annulled the conclusions adopted by the Council in which 
it held the EDP in “abeyance” and modified the recommendations previously made to it to 
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The assessment by many observers that the Council, by not observing the rules laid down in 
Treaty Article 104 and the Stability and Growth Pact, had actually exercised a discretion that 
did not comply with these provisions had thus been largely confirmed by the Court. 
The Court found first of all that, where the Commission recommends to the Council that it 
adopt decisions such as those at issue in the present case and the required majority is not 
achieved in the Council, a decision, even an implied one, does not exist for the purposes of 
the Treaty.  
Consequently,  the  Court  found  that  failure  by  the  Council  to  adopt  the  decisions 
recommended by the Commission did not constitute an act challengeable by an action for 
annulment and it declared this part of the action to be inadmissible. The Court accordingly, 
as indicated, annulled the Council’s conclusions of 25 November 2003.  
The Court of Justice, by stressing that the Council does not have the competence to depart 
from the rules laid down by the Treaty, provided a welcome clarification of the assignment 
of competences to the Commission and the Council as far as the Broad Economic Guidelines 
and the Excessive Deficit Procedure were concerned. 
First  of  all,  the  Court  stressed  that  only  the  Commission  has  the  competence  to  make 
recommendations concerning the EDP. It does, however, recognise that there may be cases 
where the majority required for adopting a decision may not be achieved. However, in this 
case the Council can do nothing more than to take note of unilateral commitments of the 
member states concerned by the EDP. 
Secondly,  the  Council  does  not  have  the  competence  to  modify  the  recommendations 
without being prompted by the Commission. However, the Council’s conclusions in this case 
were  not  preceded  by  Commission  initiatives  and,  furthermore,  they  were  adopted  in 
accordance with the voting rules prescribed for a “decision to give notice”. 
The final outcome of this “case law” was therefore a certain strengthening of the power of 
the Commission and, notably, of the role of the Broad Economic Guidelines in the policy 
making apparatus of the EU. However, the Court also recognised that the Council may not 
actually be in a position to achieve a qualified majority in support of any recommendation 
from  the  Commission.  Consequently,  in  case  the  Council  does  not  deliver  the  sanctions 
envisaged, the whole EDP may remain a political process with only limited influence on 
national policy-making. 
3.6  The Commission’s Communication of 3 September 2004 
With the judgement as the starting position for a reconsideration of the application of Article 
104  and  the  SGP,  the  Commission  on  3  September  2004  adopted  a  Communication  on 
“Strengthening economic governance and clarifying the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact”.3 
This  Communication  examined  firstly  how  the  fiscal  framework  –  and  in  particular  the 
Stability and Growth Pact – could respond to the shortcomings experienced so far through 
greater emphasis to economic developments in recommendations and an increased focus on 
safeguarding the sustainability of public finances. Secondly, this Communication addressed 
how the instruments for EU economic governance could be better interlinked in order to 
enhance the contribution of fiscal policy to economic growth and support progress towards 
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realising the Lisbon strategy4 Thirdly, the Communication suggested possible improvements 
to the enforcement of the framework. 
In  developing  this  approach,  the  Commission  stated  explicitly  taking  into  account  the 
implications  of  the  ruling  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  of  13  July  that  clarified  the 
respective  roles  of  the  Commission  and  the  Council  in  the  application  of  the  EU  fiscal 
framework. The ruling also in the opinion of the Commission confirmed that a rules-based 
system is the best guarantee for commitments to be enforced and for all member states to be 
treated equally. 
The  Commission  then  proposed  to  refocus  the  SGP  by  placing  more  emphasis  on 
government debt and sustainability in the surveillance of budgetary positions. Furthermore 
it suggested to allow for more country-specific circumstances in defining the SGP medium-
term deficit objective of “close to balance or in surplus” and, finally to consider the specific 
economic circumstances and developments in the implementation of the EDP. As stated in 
the Communication the Commission would in consultation with the member states continue 
the work to elaborate these ideas and render them operational and then present legislative 
proposals to implement the new rules. 
4.  The Lisbon strategy and the “three pillar approach”  
The  new  Commission  installed  in  the  autumn  of  2004  faced  the  challenge  of  taking 
responsibility for the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy and of formulating a stance 
with respect to the future of the Stability and Growth Pact. The status of the two policy 
issues are different, with the Lisbon strategy being essentially a common set of objectives to 
be pursued by member states within the framework of the Open Method of Coordination 
and the SGP being founded on the Treaty. However, at the level of EU policy-making it was 
clearly not possible to fully disentangle the two sets of policy issues and the Commission 
apparently decided to focus mainly on the re-launching of the Lisbon strategy, leaving the 
SGP issues to be debated at the level of the Presidency of the Council. 
On 9 March 2005, Commission President Barroso in the European Parliament stressed that 
the first five years of Lisbon had not delivered the hoped-for results and that, in key areas 
from productivity to research and education spending, early school leavers or poverty the 
EU had barely managed to make progress on closing the gaps that existed in year 2000. He 
did not, however, announce any new initiatives aimed at accelerating the implementation of 
the Lisbon agenda.  
As far as the SGP is concerned, the Presidency in the run-up to the spring 2005 Summit 
struggled to arrive at a consensus between the various antagonists, with France, Germany 
and Italy apparently aiming at an explicit agreement on the interpretation of the provisions 
while a number of other member states clearly opposed any modifications. The Commission 
did not express any official views on the SGP, but in early March two key staff members of 
DG ECFIN argued in a publication published by that Directorate (see Deroose & Langedijk, 
2005)  that  the  3%  ceiling  on  budget  deficits  should  not  only  be  preserved  but  the 
effectiveness  of  both  the  preventive  and  corrective  elements  of  the  Pact  needed  to  be 
reinforced by stronger institutions, improved surveillance and transparency plus enhanced 
peer pressure and reliable, complete and timely statistics. 
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A new element in the puzzle emerged with the announcement in late 2004 that the Greek 
budget  deficit  had  in  fact  already  by  the  time  the  Drachma  joined  the  eurozone  been 
seriously  under  recorded  and  that,  consequently,  Greece  ought  to  be  the  subject  of  an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure as well.  
After the 2004 enlargement, an EDP was initiated as regards Hungary and in 2008 as regards 
the  United  Kingdom.  However,  with  the  emergence  of  the  financial  crisis  and  the 
deterioration of budget balances in 2008-09, a large number of EDPs were, in fact, launched 
on 18 February 2009 (France, Latvia, Ireland, Greece and Spain), on 13 May 2009 (Poland, 
Romania and Lithuania) on 7 October 2009 (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia) and on 12 May 2010 (Denmark and Cyprus) in 
all cases with a horizon of 2012-16 for correction of the deficits. 
Furthermore,  faced  with  the  implications  of  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  and  the 
increasing diversity of fiscal and monetary responses to the new challenges, the Commission 
and the Council already in 2010 initiated explorations of the path towards strengthening of 
the economic policy coordination and, in particular, the ways to ensure the most appropriate 
mix of the monetary policy and the financial stability mechanisms of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the budgetary policy of the eurozone member states plus the monetary and 
budgetary policy decided and implemented by the non-eurozone member states. 
5.  Towards a Banking Union? 
In a special contribution5 to the Padoa-Schioppa Report, Paul Krugman stressed that “the 
desire to prevent 1930s-style bank collapses has led nearly all nations to provide a safety net 
of deposit insurance, together with implicit guarantees that the government will bail out the 
banking system if necessary. He also underlined that the explicit and implicit guarantees of 
governments  to  the  financial  system  are  not  unconditional  and  that  they  are  backed  by 
regulations on exposure and capitalisation requirements that insure that bank equity is large 
enough to bear much of the responsibility of adverse outcomes. He then moved on to argue 
that integration on financial markets requires revision of the regulatory framework and that, 
without such a revision, capital flows will be motivated more by a search for loopholes than 
a search for real economic opportunities, and reduce the welfare instead of increasing it. 
Furthermore Krugman argued that if fiscal problems make seignorage an important source 
of revenue, the problem is compounded so that a country that relies to a significant extent on 
inflation for revenue will offer a strong negative real return on its currency and a low real 
return  on  bank  deposits.  Although  Krugman  did  not  discuss  in  depth  the  additional 
complications  and  challenges  in  a  full  monetary  union  as  the  eurozone,  he  nevertheless 
ended up arguing for both a coordinated regulation of the banking system and for moves to 
achieving enhanced coordination of fiscal policies. 
Not  even  the  cautionary  Krugman  probably  envisaged  the  huge  expansion  of  financial 
institutions’  balances,  the  boosting  of  leverage  and  increase  in  cross-frontier  capital 
movements following the liberalisation of the banking system in the United States and in 
other  OECD  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  assumption  of  the  capacity  of  efficient  and 
transparent markets to regulate themselves apparently did not stand up to the challenge of 
the accelerated cross-frontier capital flows and the sub-prime bubble in the United States and 
a number of European countries, inside and outside the eurozone. 
The  bursting  of  this  bubble  in  2007-08  furthermore  demonstrated  that  the  traditional 
perceptions  of  macroeconomic  policy  as  consisting  of  budgetary  and  monetary  policy 
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responsible  for  finding  the  most  appropriate mix  of  these  two  policy  components  would 
need to be complemented by a third component which could best be termed: financial and 
regulatory policy or, alternatively, capital market policy. 
Faced with the risk of a number of bank failures as a result of the bursting of the bubble, the 
Federal Reserve in the United States undertook strong measures to stabilise the system. The 
European  Union  also  took  strong  measures,  although  of  a  somewhat  different  nature 
creating, in May 2010 a “European Financial Stability Facility”. Its task was to manage the 
€780 billion in financial aid guarantees made necessary as debt-laden euro members try to 
cope  with  the  fall-out  from  the financial  crisis.  The  EFSF  is  part  of  the  wider  European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). The fund, which provides temporary financial 
assistance,  is  supported  by  the  17  euro  members  to  the  tune  of  €500  billion,  with  the 
remainder  provided  by  the  IMF.  Germany  is  the  single  biggest  guarantor,  followed  by 
France and Italy. Together, Germany and France provide 50% of the total guarantees. 
The facility was boosted to €1 trillion to in October 2011 as part of the financial package 
agreed by euro states in response to the sovereign debt crisis. The other two elements of the 
deal included the write-off of 50% of Greek debts, and the €106 billion recapitalisation of 
banks. 
Nevertheless the Financial Stability Mechanism proved to be insufficient to cope with the 
increasing problems of sovereign debt for some of the European countries, giving rise to 
enhanced pressures for stronger efforts of solidarity. However, some important eurozone 
countries  firmly  resisted  any  new  solidarity  measures  without  increasing  common 
constraints on the national budgetary policy. 
The European Council meeting on 9 December 2011 discussed the incorporation of aspects of 
a reinforced SGP rules into the EU Treaties. Only the United Kingdom was openly opposed 
to the proposal, but this veto effectively blocked the incorporation of the reinforced SGP 
rules into the EU Treaties, as unanimous support from all member states is required to bring 
about treaty change.6 This gave rise to the adoption on 2 March 2012, by 25 member states (in 
addition to the UK, the Czech Republic opted out) of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. 
In addition, however, the European Commission in September 2012 put forward a proposal 
for a ‘banking union’ with the declared aim of placing the banking sector on “a more sound 
footing and restore confidence in the euro as part of a longer-term vision for economic and 
monetary integration”.7 The two regulations proposed involve in particular the creation of a 
single supervisory mechanism (SSM) for eurozone member states, to be run by the European 
Central  Bank.  The  subsequent  debate  has,  however,  raised  an  issue  as  to  whether  the 
creation of such an additional mechanism would require changing the Treaty. The creation 
of  the  banking  union  was  therefore still  pending  in  April  2013  while  the  Fiscal  Stability 
Treaty, in fact, came into force in January 2013. 
6.  The Fiscal Stability Treaty 
As strongly emphasised in the preamble of the Treaty, its main purpose is to introduce strict 
observance of the quantitative criteria in the Maastricht Treaty and the SCP and to introduce 
more rigorous rules for budgetary discipline without modifying the 60% limit for public debt 
in proportion to nominal GDP. 
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The provisions of the Treaty may be summarised as follows: 
  The  budgetary  position  of  a  ‘contracting  party’  must  respect  a  country-specific 
medium-term objective as defined in the SGP with a lower limit of a ‘structural deficit’ 
of 0.5% of GDP but with the time-frame fixed with due account of country-specific 
sustainability risks. 
  The lower limit for the structural deficit may be increased to 1% once the public debt is 
lower than 60% of GDP. 
  The speed of reduction of the deficit is fixed at one-twentieth of the gap between the 
actual deficit and the limit. 
  In  the  case  of  failure  on  behalf  of  a  contracting  party  to  comply  with  the 
recommendation,  a  procedure  may  be  launched  with  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Union (CJEU), which can impose a sanction not exceeding 0.1% of its GDP. 
In addition the Stability Treaty stipulates some more formal rules of governance and also, 
importantly in Article 16 that within five years at most of the entry into force, on the basis of 
an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken 
with the aim of incorporating the substance of the Fiscal Treaty into the legal framework of 
the European Union. 
The only really significant innovation due to the Fiscal Treaty is the assignment to the CJEU 
of the responsibility of deciding to sanction a member state for having an excessive deficit.  
In addition, however, the Stability Treaty (in Article 8) stipulates that where, on the basis of 
the Commission’s assessments, taking account of observations from the country concerned, 
the latter has failed to comply with its obligations, the “matter will be brought to the Court of 
Justice by one or more Contracting Parties”. And where a Contracting Party, independently 
of the Commission’s report, considers that another Contracting Party has failed to comply 
with the provisions, it may also bring the matter to the Court of Justice. In fact, according to 
Article 8: Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of the European Commission, a 
Contracting  Party  considers  that  another  Contracting  Party  has  not  taken  the  necessary 
measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice, it may bring the case before 
the  Court  of  Justice  and  request  the  imposition  of  financial  sanctions  following  criteria 
established by the European Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
The inter-governmental nature of the Stability Treaty is also made evident by the fact that the 
Commission, despite its important role in the preparation of the reports and conclusions as 
regards the existence of an excessive deficit, is not as such entitled to bring a case before the 
Court  of  Justice.  However,  as  regards  the  eurozone  countries,  Article  7  stipulates  an 
“obligation” for the members to support the proposals or recommendations submitted by the 
European Commission where it considers that a eurozone member state is in breach of the 
deficit criterion in the excessive deficit procedure. This obligation, however, shall not apply if 
a qualified majority is opposed to the decision proposed or recommended. 
As indicated, for example, in the Report by the House of Lords’ European Union Committee8 
the  Treaty  raises  a  number  of  other  questions,  particularly  concerning  the  relationship 
between it and the EU Treaties and laws made under those treaties; and the proper role of 
EU institutions. It stresses that the history of the institutional development of the European 
Union is characterised by pragmatic flexibility and ‘finding a way’, suggesting that some of 
the rough legal edges of the proposed treaty will be softened over time. With the United 
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Kingdom reducing its objection to the use of the EU institutions under the Treaty, it might be 
argued that this process is already underway. But even so, the lack of clarity about whether it 
is legitimate for the treaty to confer new functions on institutions of the European Union, 
and the extensive overlap between the provisions of this treaty and functions, which have 
already been imposed by EU legislation, is according to this Report, undesirable.  
In a debate at the European University Institute, the Stability Treaty has been characterised 
as a “legal monster” but the views of Miguel Maduro, professor of European Law at the EUI, 
were more “balanced”.9 According to Maduro, the treaty has a political function and this is 
the value he assigned to this treaty. He, in fact, argued the Treaty has not been adopted 
because European political leaders genuinely believed that this is what the markets want to 
end the crisis but that they believed that this may have a political legitimating function with 
respect to the national public opinions, notably in Germany.  
Another issue is, however, to what extent the Stability Treaty, due to its inter-governmental 
nature, can be expected to entail a modification of the roles of the EU institutional pattern 
and, notably, the role of the European Parliament. In this respect, Article 13 of the Treaty 
stipulates  that  the  European Parliament  and  the  national  Parliaments  of  the  “contracting 
parties”  will  together  determine  the  organisation  and  promotion  of  a  conference  of 
representatives of the “relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives 
of the relevant committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and 
other issues covered by this Treaty”. 
In considering these implications of the Stability Treaty, Andreas Maurer, in a working paper 
of  the  Italian  Institute  of  International  Affairs,10 argues  that  the  recent  developments  in 
reforming  EMU  are  problematic  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  the  reforms  strengthen 
cooperation among the governments of the euro-17, while widely ignoring the parliamentary 
component  and  the  more  general  issue  of  democratic  legitimacy  of  the  deepened  EMU 
(DEMU). He stresses that neither the European Parliament nor the national parliaments are 
provided with a uniform or coordinated, reliable control mechanism whereby parliamentary 
oversight  is  combined  with  the  possibility  of  political  and  legal  sanctions  against  the 
decision-makers of the European Council, its President and the Eurogroup. And although 
the Lisbon Treaty explicitly holds that the European Council “shall not exercise legislative 
functions”,  the  heads  of  state  and  government  increasingly  step  in  to  mandate  the 
Commission with rather fixed sets of reform proposals for further policy-initiation and to ask 
their President to present proposals with a view to reform the EMU.  
According  to  Maurer,  the  European  Parliament  is  only  informed  of  the  results  of  the 
European  Council  meetings  and  Eurogroup  summits,  its  President  participates  in  the 
beginning of the meetings, and some of the MEPs get informal access to the negotiation table, 
but the Parliament at large remains a passive observer. The resulting democratic deficit is not 
compensated through national parliaments, since only a few of them are able to force their 
governments into both ex-ante and ex-post scrutiny. 
What remains to be seen is, however, also the reality of legal procedures initiated when a 
“Contracting Party” actually makes use of the provisions in the Treaty and puts a case before 
the Court of Justice. At stake here is the interpretation by the Court of the provisions in 
Article 3 and, notably, how the Court will decide as regards the definition of the annual 
structural balance of the general government as being the “cyclically-adjusted balance net of 
one-off temporary measures” and even more the definition of “exceptional circumstances” in 
paragraph 3, point ‘b’. 
                                                   
9 See Kocharov (2012). 
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Under normal circumstances the Court cannot be expected to have the in-house expertise to 
arrive  at  an  “independent”  estimate  of  the  structural  budget  balance  of  the  country 
concerned and must therefore, at least initially, rely on the estimates of this balance prepared 
by  the  Commission.  However,  the  country  brought  before  the  Court,  not  least  to  avoid 
paying  the  penalty  and  the  accompanying stigmatism,  may  argue  that  the Commission’s 
estimates do not take full account of very “special circumstances”.  
In  order  to  arrive  at  a  balanced  conclusion,  the  Court  and  the  country  concerned  may 
therefore need to call in experts from outside and it cannot be excluded that, in the end, the 
Court’s decision will not support the Commission’s views or those of the Contracting Party 
having  brought  the  case  before  the  Court.  To  arrive  at  a  purely  judicial  definition  of  a 
“structural budget balance” and “special circumstances” might thus create a rather unique 
precedent for a decision concerning a key economic variable, normally the subject of deep 
economic cleavages and academic and political debates but ultimately left to the validation 
of economists and policy makers. 
7.  Conclusions 
An institutional crisis in the European Union emerged in 2004 as the result of the ECOFIN 
Council’s  failure  to  “seize  the  reins”  and  take  sanctions  against  France  and  Germany  in 
accordance with the Excessive Deficit Procedure according to the Treaty’s Article 104, the 
associated protocol and the Stability and Growth Pact. The crisis can be seen as a symptom of 
a latent and lasting conflict between two equally valid features of the construction of the 
Union: 
1.  The need to ensure a high degree of consistency, notably in the medium and long run, 
between monetary and budgetary policy and  
2.  The  principle  of  ‘subsidiarity’,  which  can  be  taken  as  the  theological  argument  for 
assigning  the  full  competence  in  the  field  of  fiscal  affairs  and  social  policy  to  the 
national (or regional) governments. 
The need to ensure consistency between budgetary and monetary policy can, from the point 
of view of economic analysis, be based on the argument that in the long run monetary and 
budgetary policy cannot be considered to be completely independent policy instruments. 
There can be little doubt that a prospective build-up of public debt in proportion to GDP in 
the long run will put enormous pressure on monetary policy and make it increasingly costly 
for  the  economy  to  keep  inflation  under  control.  The  monetary  authorities’  concern  with 
respect to the long-term sustainability of budget balances of EU member states is therefore 
legitimate. Clearly this potential conflict was ‘forgotten’ in the 1990s and the early years of 
the  2000s,  but  it  came  out  of  hiding  with  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  of  2007  and 
onwards. 
The need to ensure a high degree of consistency between budgetary and monetary policy 
should,  however,  not  be  interpreted  as  an  argument  in  favour  of  assigning  increased 
discretionary competences to the Council in the field of budgetary policy, at least not in the 
foreseeable future.  
Admittedly, views differ with regard to the existence or the gravity of the ‘democratic deficit’ 
within the EU’s decision-making procedures. While a large number of directives are adopted 
by the Council, their implementation most often requires national legislative acts as well. 
However,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  assigning  discretionary  competences  as  regards 
public expenditure and taxation to the Council would run counter to the normal functioning 
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Allowing the Council to take binding decisions in fiscal affairs would be against the normal 
assignment  of  legislative  powers  to  the  elected  parliament.  At  the  level  of  the  EU,  such 
competences  should  therefore  only  be  transferred  from  the  national  parliaments  to  the 
European Parliament. While such transfers may well take place in a more distant future, this 
is not to be counted upon as a way to ensure consistency between budgetary and monetary 
policy. 
The Maastricht criteria, the protocol, the SGP and the Stability Treaty do not involve any 
transfer of discretionary competence to the Council and consequently do not run counter to 
normal democratic functioning of the EU institutions. From the point of view of legal status 
the provisions contained in these acts are equivalent to rules frequently found in federations 
putting  a  cap  on  allowable  budget  balances  or  obliging  regional  authorities  to  keep 
expenditure within the limits of available resources. The Treaty provisions, the SGP and the 
Stability Treaty may therefore be considered valid attempts to obtain an appropriate trade-
off  between  the  need  to  ensure  long-term  consistency  between  budgetary  and  monetary 
policy and the respect for the principle of subsidiarity. 
The  entering  into  force  of  the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the 
Economic and Monetary Union does not significantly modify the observations made above 
concerning  the  implications  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact 
assessed earlier in the paper. It does provide a slightly modified excessive deficit procedure 
and in sharp contrast to the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, stipulates a direct involvement of 
the European Court of Justice, attempting thus to fill the judicial vacuum recognised in the 
cancellation by the Court of the Council decision to suspend the excessive deficit procedure 
as regards the French and German deficits in 2003-04. 
In addition to introducing a slightly more specific constraint on budget balances, the main 
purpose of this inter-governmental treaty was, in fact, to make an attempt to fill the legal 
void  demonstrated  by  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  against France  and  Germany.  This 
procedure having been concluded by the cancellation by the European Court of Justice of the 
Council’s decision to suspend the procedure, the future of the excessive-deficit procedure in 
fact  depended  upon  the  unlikely  adoption  by  the  Council  of  a  Commission  proposal  to 
sanction a member state in a situation of excessive deficit.  
However, the transfer to the Court of Justice of the final decision as to whether or not a 
“Contracting Party” is in fact in a situation of excessive deficit and whether it should be 
sanctioned by a fine leaves serious questions open: On what criteria should the Court take 
this decision in case there is disagreement as regards the nature of the deficit and the route to 
be  followed  towards  reduction  of  this  deficit?  Given  the  exceptionally  large  number  of 
excessive-deficit procedures now under way (20), it may be legitimate to apprehend with 
some doubts the unfolding and outcome of these procedures from 2013 to 2016 and beyond. 
All-in-all,  the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and  Governance  in  the  Economic  and 
Monetary Union does not seem to offer a definitive solution to the problem of finding the 
appropriate budgetary-monetary policy mix in the EMU already well identified in the Delors 
Report in 1989, regularly emphasised ever since and now seriously aggravated due to the 
crisis.  Furthermore,  the  implementation  of  this  Treaty  may  under  certain  circumstances 
contribute to an increase in the uncertainties as regards the distribution of the competences 
between the European Parliament and national parliaments and between the former and the 
Commission and the Council. 
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